



Technology Innovation and Market Turbulence: 
 













This paper explains market turbulence, such as the recent dotcom boom/bust 
cycle, as equilibrium industry dynamics triggered by technology innovation. 
When a major technology innovation arrives, a wave of new firms implement the 
innovation and enter the market. However, if the innovation complements 
existing technology, some new entrants will later be forced out as more and more 
incumbent firms succeed in adopting the innovation. It is shown that the 
diffusion of Internet technology among traditional brick-and-mortar firms is 
indeed the driving force behind the rise and fall of dotcoms as well as the 
sustained growth of e-commerce. Systematic empirical evidence from retail and 
banking industries supports the theoretical findings. 
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Figure 1: Internet Stock Index and Dotcom Death Toll
1 Motivation
Technology innovation is one of the most fundamental impulses that set and keep the
market economy in motion. It incessantly transforms production and consumption
as well as organization of ﬁrms and industries, destroying old ones and creating new
ones — a process that Schumpeter named Creative Destruction. The recent Internet
innovation and following dotcom boom/bust cycle has presented itself, although in
an unconventional sense, as a dramatic example of this process.
Internet technology became commercially available in the middle of the 1990s.
Soon after, the potential of electronic commerce was discovered. A huge wave of
companies, so-called “dotcoms”, were then formed to conduct business over the In-
ternet. A typical dotcom ﬁrm is an Internet pure play that operates only from its
2online Web site. Its ability to reach customers in vast geographic regions via the
Internet, while not having to invest in building physical facilities, has been among its
most attractive features for investors and entrepreneurs. During a short period, es-
pecially 1998 and 1999, about 7,000-10,000 new substantial dotcom companies were
established,1 most with a vision of generating huge market values after taking the
ﬁrm public. The boom fueled tremendous excitement throughout the business world.
H o w e v e r ,t h es p r i n go f2 0 0 0w a sat u r n i n gp o i n t .T h ed o t c o ms t o c ki n d e xb e g a nt o
f a l la n di tb o t t o m e do u ti nt h em i d d l eo f2 0 0 1 ,w h e nt h ed o t c o me x i tr a t eh i ti t sp e a k .
The stock index stabilized afterwards, while dotcom exits continued, though at a
decreasing rate. Up to the ﬁrst quarter of 2003, nearly 5,000 dotcom companies exited
the market, of which at least 3,892 were sold and 962 closed or declared bankruptcy.2
From peak to bottom, the Dow Jones Internet stock index3 plummeted by 93%, and
the Nasdaq composite lost 78% of its value. The Dow Jones Internet stock index and
number of dotcom shutdowns are plotted in Figure 1.
What can explain this striking boom/bust cycle of dotcoms? To answer this
question, there are several theories. Most of them appeal to ﬁnancial bubbles, rational
or irrational (Shiller 2000, Abreu and Brunnermeier 2003, Ofek & Richardson 2003,
LeRoy 2004). However, as Garber (2000) has persuasively argued, “[bubble] is a
1Data Source: Webmergers.com, a San Francisco-based company that monitors the internet
mergers and acquisitions. Webmergers.com counts as “substantial” all internet companies that have
received some formal outside funding from venture capitalists or other investors.
2Data Source: Webmergers.com, which issues monthly reports on dotcom shutdowns and M&As.
3Dow Jones deﬁnes an Internet stock as the stock of a company that generates more than 50% of
its annual revenues directly from the Internet. With 40 components, the Dow Jones Internet stock
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Figure 2: US Retail E-Commerce Sales as a Percent of Total Retail Sales
fuzzy word ﬁlled with import but lacking a solid operational deﬁnition. Thus, one
can make whatever one wants of it.” More important, even if a bubble did exist, it
still remains a puzzle what changes of real fundamentals, if any, could have induced
the bubble to form and burst in the ﬁrst place. Some other theories try to build more
upon economic foundations, especially uncertainties in new markets. For example,
uncertainties about proﬁtability (Pastor and Veronesi 2004, Horvath, Schivardi and
Woywode 2001), pre-production (Jovanovic 2004) or potential market size (Rob 1996,
Zeira 1999). Those factors certainly play important roles in the new economy, but
some key issues are still overlooked. In particular, the nature of competition in the
Internet-related market has not been fully understood and analyzed.
To illustrate this point, Figure 2 presents the time trend of the US retail e-
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Figure 3: Percentage of Online Retail Sales: Dotcoms vs. Multichannel Retailers
commerce sales as a percent of total retail sales.4 It shows clearly that e-commerce
has kept a strong and stable growth in spite of the dramatic shakeout of dotcom
companies. What could have been driving this sustained growth? The evidence in
Figure 3, showing the composition of retail e-commerce over time,5 suggests that a
major driving force is the increasing online presence of traditional brick-and-mortar
ﬁrms.6 Therefore, in order to better understand the rise and fall of dotcoms, we have
to look into the dynamic competition among ﬁrms of diﬀerent types in the market,
4Data Source: The Census Bureau of the Department of Commerce (Estimates are adjusted for
seasonal variation and holiday and trading-day diﬀerences, but not for price changes).
5Data Source: The State of Online Retailing (2001, 2002, 2003), an annual survey conducted by
Shop.org, Boston Consulting Group and Forrester Research.
6Improvement of Internet technology and changes of consumer preference for e-commerce prob-
ably also played a role in the process.
5in particular, online pure plays vs. traditional brick-and-mortar ﬁrms.
Here is the explanation of this paper. When a major technology innovation (e.g.
Internet) arrives, a wave of new ﬁrms (e.g. dotcoms) enter the market to compete
with the incumbents (e.g. brick-and-mortar ﬁrms). This entry is especially facili-
tated by the lower entry cost associated with the new technology (e.g. lower physical
investment required for dotcoms). However, if the new technology (e.g. Internet)
is complementary to existing technology (e.g. brick-and-mortar), some new entrants
(e.g. dotcoms) will later be forced out as more and more incumbent ﬁrms succeed
in adopting the innovation (e.g. becoming so-called “click-and-mortar” ﬁrms). Dur-
ing this process, the contribution of new technology to the total industry output
(e.g. share of e-commerce in total commerce) keeps rising, while the share of new-
technology-only ﬁrms (e.g. dotcoms) keeps falling.
To formalize this idea, this paper develops a dynamic equilibrium model based
on the original work of Jovanovic & MacDonald (1994).7 In a competitive market,
forward-looking ﬁrms make optimal decisions on entry, exit and technology adoption
based on sunk cost and learning opportunity. Without assuming aggregate uncer-
tainty, the model generates mass entry and exit of dotcoms as the result of a com-
plementary technology innovation — the Internet. Adding aggregate uncertainty to
the model does not change the main analysis, but helps explain the timing and ﬁnan-
cial loss of the shakeout. Moreover, this paper considers explicitly each individual
ﬁrm’s uncertainty in adopting new technology, which explains the delayed adoption
7This paper, taking a step further from Jovanovic & MacDonald (1994), allows new entrants to
bypass old technology and emphasizes the roles that sunk cost and technological complementarity
play in the industry evolution.
6of Internet among incumbent ﬁr m sa sw e l la st h eh i g hm a r k e t - t o - b o o kv a l u ef o rt h o s e
successful adopters (e.g. dotcoms and click-and-mortar ﬁrms).
Our theoretical ﬁndings are supported by systematic empirical evidence. Explor-
ing an original dataset of top 400 E-retailers across 14 major retail categories, we ﬁnd
that incumbent multichannel retailers enjoy a substantial advantage over the dotcoms
in both online sales and total sales. That advantage stems from the great synergy be-
tween the online and oﬄine channels as well as many forms of complementary assets
that incumbent ﬁrms possess. A similar pattern is also found in the banking industry
in which incumbent multichannel banks dominate the dotcoms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, in which we study
competitive industry dynamics reacting to an exogenous technology innovation. De-
pending on characteristics of the innovation, such as entry cost and complementarity
with existing technology, the industry evolution paths are very diﬀerent. Section 3
applies the model to Internet innovation in commerce, which features low entry cost
and strong complementarity with traditional brick-and-mortar technology, to explain
t h em a s se n t r ya n de x i to fd o t c o mﬁrms. Empirical studies on retail and banking
industries conﬁrm our theoretical ﬁndings. Section 4 oﬀers ﬁnal remarks.
2M o d e l
2.1 Background
The model is cast in discrete time and inﬁnite horizon. The environment is a compet-
itive market for a homogenous good. On the demand side, the behavior of consumers
7is summarized by a time-invariant market demand curve D(P), which is continuous
and strictly declining. On the supply side, there is a continuum of ﬁrms with total
mass ﬁxed at unity. Each ﬁrm maximizes the present discounted value of its proﬁts.
At each time t,aﬁrm decides whether to stay in the industry. If he does, the
ﬁrm receives a proﬁt ﬂow that depends on the market price and his technology state.
Otherwise, he exits and gets an alternative return of πθ.Aﬁrm’s technology can be
in one of four states. The ﬁrst is a primitive one θ in which the ﬁrm cannot produce
in the industry and thus earns zero net revenue to participate. All ﬁrms are endowed
with this technology. The second one b is the traditional technology of production
(In the context of Internet economy, it refers to the brick — traditional brick-and-
mortar ﬁrms). The third one c is a technology innovation (In the context of Internet
economy, it refers to the click — the online pure plays, dotcoms). The last one h
is a combination of the traditional technology and the innovation (In the context of
Internet economy, it refers to the hybrid — the click-and-mortar ﬁrms).
Before the innovation c arrives, only technology states θ and b are available. A
ﬁrm can either choose to stay out and earn πθ,o rp a yaﬁxed cost Sb to obtain the
technology b to produce in the industry. After the innovation c arrives, ﬁrms then
have more options. In particular, if a ﬁrm pays a ﬁxed cost Sc, he may learn how to
implement the new technology c though the success is random with the probability
σ. As a result, two new types of ﬁrms, in addition to the traditional brick one,
may appear in the industry. For example, if a new entrant succeeds entering with
technology c, he then becomes a click ﬁrm; if an incumbent brick ﬁrm succeeds
adopting the new technology, he then becomes a hybrid ﬁrm.8 Therefore, driven by
8It is possible that brick ﬁrms may have a diﬀerent success rate σ from pure play entrants, but
8the technology innovation and its diﬀusion, the market equilibrium generates time
paths of product price Pt, industry output Qt and entry and exit of each type of ﬁrms.
These time paths are thus the foci of our study.
2.2 Pre-Innovation Equilibrium
The market for the homogenous good starts at time 0 when technology states θ and
b become available. At time 0, though all ﬁrms have the opportunity to earn a proﬁt
πθ from working somewhere else, some of them may choose to enter this market. For
those entrants, they pay an once-and-for-all ﬁxed cost Sb to implement the technology
b. The corresponding return is a proﬁt ﬂow of πb
t, which is a standard proﬁtf u n c t i o n
that depends on price Pt and technology b,i . e .
π
b








where Cb refers to the cost function for technology b,a n dqb





For simplicity, we have assumed that the technology b is a standard practice that
involves no uncertainty to implement, and any future innovation like technology c
may arrive at a probability too small to aﬀect a ﬁrm’s decision. Therefore, at each
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t) is the maximum value of a ﬁrm with technology θ (b)a tt i m et,a n d
β is the discount factor.
assuming that does not aﬀect our analysis except allowing our model to be more ﬂexible.
9The corresponding equilibrium is straightforward. Since the entry is free, there



























where Nb is the number of brick ﬁr m si nt h i sm a r k e t .
Using Equations 3 and 4, we can then solve for the equilibrium price P∗,n u m b e r
of ﬁrms Nb, an individual ﬁrm’s output qb as well as the market total output Q.I t
implies a simple industry dynamic path — at time 0, ﬁrms decide whether to enter the
new market. Nb of them then pay a cost Sb to enter and stay there afterwards. Since
it takes one period to transform the technology from state θ to b,n oﬁrm is able to
produce in the new market at time 0.F r o mt i m e1 on, the industry has a ﬁxed price
P∗ and output Q = D(P∗)=Nbqb(P∗), and there will be no further entry and exit.
2.3 Post-Innovation Equilibrium
At time T, the innovation c arrives as an unexpected shock and triggers a market
turbulence. Now that ﬁrms have more options because of the technology progress,
10they have to reconsider entry and exit. The optimal decision problems for each type
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Equations 5 to 8 say the following.
• A ﬁrm with primitive technology θ may choose to keep staying out of this
market, or pay a ﬁxed cost Sb to enter with technology b,o rp a yaﬁxed cost
Sc to hopefully enter with technology c (the probability of success is σ).I n
addition, it is even possible for him to pay both cost Sb and Sc to implement
technology b and c at the same time. By doing that, he may enter as a hybrid
ﬁrm if he succeed in learning about the innovation c (the probability is σ), or
he may become a traditional brick ﬁrm if he fails (the probability is 1 − σ).
• A traditional brick ﬁrm has option to work somewhere else, or stay in the
market with technology b,o rp a yaﬁxed cost Sc to hopefully implement the
technology c.I fh es u c c e e d si ni m p l e m e n t i n gc (the probability is σ), he then
transforms himself into a hybrid ﬁr m ;i fh ef a i l s ,h es t a y sa sabrick ﬁrm (the
probability is 1 − σ).
11• A click ﬁrm has option to work somewhere else, or stay in the market with
technology c,o rp a yaﬁxed cost Sb to implement the technology b. If he invests
Sb, he can then transform himself into a hybrid ﬁrm.
• A hybrid ﬁrm does not have to invest in any new technology, and can implement
whatever technology θ, b, c or h to pursue the highest proﬁt.
Depending on the value of parameters, there can be a number of resulting equi-
librium time paths. To keep our discussion more focused, we assume here that the
investment Sb is too large for any type of ﬁrms to ﬁnd it proﬁtable from time T on.
It is indeed true in the dotcom context — it takes a relatively small amount of invest-
ment to start an online store which can then serve the national or even international
market. However, the cost would be prohibitive to reach that extent of a market
using the traditional brick-and-mortar technology.9 Therefore, Equations 5 to 8 can
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Now the equilibrium time paths depend on how the new technology c is related
to the traditional technology b. In the following, we discuss two scenarios. First, we
9Our empirical studies on retail and banking industries in section 3 conﬁrm that many brick-and-
mortar ﬁrms have become major online players, while few dotcoms have ever developed substantial
oﬄine channels.
12assume that the innovation complements the traditional technology in the sense that





t). Second, we assume that the new technology dominates
the traditional one in the sense that it is absolutely superior and even better than











the industry tends to experience a shakeout of the new entrants. Still, we have to






t.L e t u s s t a r t
















t). The market equilibrium path can be characterized as follows.
At time T,a sl o n ga st h ee n t r yc o s tSc is suﬃciently small, some ﬁrms will choose
to invest in the new technology. As the result, Nθ type-θ ﬁrms attempt entering the

















Given that Sc is suﬃciently small, the existing Nb brick ﬁrms will also ﬁnd it
13proﬁtable to upgrade the technology.10 S i n c ei tt a k e so n ep e r i o df o rt h et e c h n o l o g y
upgrade to eﬀect, there is no change of price and output at time T.
At time T +1 ,a m o n ga l lt h eNθ entry attempts, a fraction of σ turns out to
succeed. Hence there will be nc
T+1 = σNθ click ﬁrms in the market. Also, as long as
there are click ﬁrms in the market, no brick ﬁrms will choose to exit since πb
t >π c
t ≥
πθ. Among all the Nb brick ﬁrms, a fraction of σ succeeds in adopting technology c,
hence the number of hybrid ﬁrm becomes nh
T+1 = σNb. The rest brick ﬁrms will have
to try upgrading for the next period. As the supply increases, the price declines, and
no more type-θ ﬁrms will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to enter.
After time T+1,a sm o r ea n dm o r ebrick ﬁrms succeed in adopting the innovation,
the output keeps increasing and price keeps declining. The price will eventually reach
a critical value Pc at time Tc that makes click ﬁrms indiﬀerent to stay or exit the
market.
















b[1 − (1 − σ)
t−T].





10In another word, the complementarity gain from upgrading technology b to h needs to be large
enough. Here, we assume that V h
t −V b
t >S c/(βσ) holds for all t ≥ T +1so that brick ﬁrms always
ﬁnd it proﬁtable to upgrade.



















D(Pc) − Nb(1 − σ)Tc−Tqb(Pc) − Nb[1 − (1 − σ)Tc−T]qh(Pc)
qc(Pc)
, (14)








For t>T c, as the rest brick ﬁrms continuously succeed in adopting the innovation,
more click ﬁrms have to exit to keep the price at the level Pc.A t e a c h t i m e , t h e
number of exiting ﬁrms xc

























Nbσ(1 − σ)t−(T+1)(qh(Pc) − qb(Pc))
qc(Pc)
. (16)
In the long run, if we have nc
Tcqc(Pc) ≥ nb
Tc[qh(Pc) − qb(Pc)], not all click ﬁrms
will exit and the market will keep price at Pc and output at D(Pc).H o w e v e r , i f
we have nc
Tcqc(Pc) <n b
Tc[qh(Pc) − qb(Pc)], then the market price will eventually fall
again and the shakeout of brick ﬁrms may also be possible.
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There are several further results that we can learn from the model.
Proposition 1 The value of a click ﬁrm rises from V θ at time T to V θ+ Sc
βσ at time
T +1 , and then declines back to V θ at time Tc and afterwards. In the meantime, it
enjoys a high market-to-book value, i.e. V c
t /V θ > 1.11
Proof. At time T, given the free entry condition, a click ﬁrm must have the same
value V θ as a type-θ ﬁrm; at time Tc and afterwards, a click ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between





























Hence the value of a click ﬁrm rises from V θ at time T to V θ + Sc
βσ at time T +1,
a n dt h e nd e c l i n e sb a c kt oV θ at time Tc and afterwards. Meanwhile, V c
t /V θ > 1.
11The high market-to-book value is due to the survivor bias, and consistent with empirical ﬁndings.
Using Thomson Venture Economics dataset, Hochberg et al. (2004) shows that for VC funds raised
in 1998 and 1999, on average only 20% of a fund’s portfolio companies (presumably most were
dotcoms) have successfully exited via IPO or M&A as of Nov. 2003. Using the same dataset,
Gompers et al. (2005) reports that for Internet and Computer companies that did successfully go
to public, the average Q value jumped to 6 in 2000, and fell to 2 in 2001 and to 1.5 in 2003.
16Proposition 2 Click ﬁrms start exiting at time Tc, but the number of exits keeps
falling after time Tc +1 .
Proof. Given Equation 16, we have ∂xc
t/∂t < 0 for t ≥ Tc +1 .
Furthermore, we tend to observe that out of the total output, the share that uses
the innovation keeps rising from time T +1on, but the contribution of click ﬁrms
keeps falling. In the context of Internet economy, it implies that the e-commerce’s
share of total output keeps rising but dotcoms’ contribution keeps falling (Recall
Figure 2 and 3). To see that, let us assume for a hybrid ﬁrm, the share ω of sales is
conducted using the online channel and is counted as e-commerce sales.
Proposition 3 If ω is large, out of the total output, the share using the innovation
keeps rising from time T +1on, but the contribution of click ﬁrms keeps falling.
Proof. Denote s the share of total output that use the innovation, and sc the
contribution of click ﬁrms. We have
st =1−







Hence, if ω>1 − (qb
t/qh
t ),w eh a v e∂st/∂t > 0 and ∂sc,t/∂t < 0 for t ≥ T +1 .
In summary, Case 1 oﬀers the following ﬁndings, as illustrated with Figure 4.
• The number of click ﬁrms peaks from time T +1to Tc, and declines afterwards;
• Click ﬁrms start exiting at time Tc, but the number of exits keeps falling after
time Tc +1 ;
17Figure 4: Dynamics of Stock Value and Firm Exits: Complementary Innovation
• The value of a click ﬁrm rises from V θ at time T to V θ + Sc
βσ at time T +1,a n d
then declines back to V θ at time Tc and afterwards. In the meantime, it enjoys
a high market-to-book value: V c
t /V θ > 1;
• As more ﬁrms adopt the technology innovation over time, market output Qt keeps
rising and price Pt keeps falling up to time Tc or possibly even afterwards;
• Out of the total output, the share that uses the innovation keeps rising from




t The above analysis can be similarly applied to the second






t. In particular, the equilibrium
industry dynamics until time T +1are the same as last case: At time T, Nθ type-θ
18ﬁr m sa sw e l la sNb existing brick ﬁrms attempt adopting the new technology c,b u t
price and output do not change. At time T +1 , σNθ click ﬁrms and σNb hybrid
ﬁrms succeed implementing the new technology. As the supply increases, the price
declines, and no more type-θ ﬁrms will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to enter.
After time T +1 ,m o r ea n dm o r ebrick ﬁrms succeed in upgrading, hence the
output keeps increasing and price keeps declining. The price will then reach a critical





so that some brick ﬁrms no longer actively supply in the market.
However, all brick ﬁrms are continuously working on the technology upgrading.
As a result, the price will eventually fall to a critical value Pc at time Tc and click
ﬁrms start to exit.
Summary As discussed, dotcom shakeout tends to occur if hybrid is the most
proﬁtable business model, but the order of exits for click ﬁrms and brick ﬁrms may
vary due to their relative eﬃciency to each other. More generally, if individual click
or brick ﬁrms are heterogenous in eﬃciency, it is also possible to observe some click
ﬁrms and brick ﬁr m se x i ta tt h es a m et i m e .
2.3.2 Dominant Innovation





t), no shakeout would occur to the new entrants. The industry dynamics
are discussed as follows.
At time T, ﬁrms attempt adopting the new technology c.S i n c eπc
t >π h
t, hybrid is
19n o ta ta l lap r o ﬁtable model. Hence, brick and type-θ ﬁrms, if they choose to adopt










Since it takes one period for the technology upgrade to eﬀect, there is no change
of price and output at time T.A tt i m eT +1,s o m eclick ﬁrms appear in the market.
As the supply increases, the price declines, and no more ﬁrms will ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to try the innovation. Hence, from time T +1on, there is no more entry and exit.
Two possible equilibrium outcomes are discussed below.
Case 3. πb(P∗) ≤ πθ The ﬁrst equilibrium has no brick ﬁrms remaining in the
















which implies that among Nθ attempts for technology upgrading at time T (notice
that the Nθ attempts may include both type-θ and brick ﬁr m sb e c a u s et h e yh a v et h e
same opportunity cost πθ), σNθ ﬁrms succeed and produce at time T +1.F r o mt h e n
on, only click ﬁrms are in the market, and there will be no more dynamics.
In summary, Case 3 oﬀers the following ﬁndings, as illustrated with Figure 5.
• The number of click ﬁrms peaks at time T +1and stays constant afterwards;
20Figure 5: Dynamics of Stock Value and Firm Exits: Dominant Innovation
• The value of a click ﬁrm rises from V θ at time T to V θ + Sc
βσ at time T +1,a n d
stays constant afterwards. It enjoys a high market to book value: V c
t /V θ > 1;
• As ﬁrms adopt the innovation, the market output Qt rises and price Pt falls at
time T +1 , and both stay constant afterwards;
• From time T +1on, the share of total output that uses the innovation rises to
100%,a n da l lc o m ef r o mt h ec o n t r i b u t i o no fclick ﬁrms.
Case 4. πb(P∗) >π θ The analysis can be similarly applied to the other case. The




















which implies that Nθ type-θ ﬁrms attempt to enter with technology c at time T
( n o t i c et h a tn obrick ﬁrm would try adopting technology c because of the higher
opportunity cost, i.e. πb(P∗) >π θ), and the fraction σ of them succeed at time T +1.
From then on, σNθ click ﬁrms and Nb brick ﬁrms are in the market, and there will
be no more dynamics.
Summary As discussed, dotcom shakeout would not occur if the Internet innova-
tion dominates old technology, but whether brick ﬁr m se x i to rn o td e p e n d so nt h e i r
relative proﬁtability to the outside opportunity. In any case, the hybrid would not
be a proﬁtable business model.
2.4 Aggregate Uncertainty and Financial Loss
The above analysis suggests that a shakeout tends to occur to new entrants if the
innovation that they rely on is a complement rather than a replacement for the
existing technology. It is indeed the key reason for the dotcom shakeout, as we will
show in our empirical studies in section 3. However, before we move on, there is still
an unanswered question: what can explain the ﬁnancial losses incurred during the
dotcom shakeout?
A simple extension of our model can address this issue. So far, we have assumed
there is no aggregate uncertainty associated with the innovation, hence a shakeout
does not incur ﬁnancial losses.12 However, it is very plausible that aggregate uncer-
12Notice that some new entrants, who fail adopting the innovation and exit, do have ﬁnancial
22Figure 6: Industry Dynamics: Actual vs. Expected
tainty exists. In fact, it took time for market participants to understand there were
competitive disadvantages in the online-only business model. Therefore, ﬁnancial
losses are likely the result of ex ante overestimation of the dotcoms’ potential.
To see this, assume that at time T ﬁr m sh a v et om a k et h e i rd e c i s i o n st oa d o p t
the Internet innovation based on their expected proﬁts: E(πc) and E(πh).I fex ante
the market expects the innovation to dominate the old technology, this may result
in over entry of dotcom ﬁrms, (i.e. Nθ0 >N θ). When the truth is revealed ex post
(at time T +1 ), we will then observe that all entrants suﬀer ﬁnancial losses.13 The
losses. However, that risk is idiosyncratic and can be insured, e.g. a venture capitalist typically
diversify his investment portfolio over many entry attempts.
13Some other factors may also induce over entry, e.g. overestimating market demand, underesti-
mating the learning rate of incumbent ﬁrms and etc. However, the analyses would be similar.
23Figure 7: Industry Dynamics: Actual vs. Counterfactual
comparison of industry dynamics is illustrated with Figure 6.
Using this example, we can further compare the industry dynamics under imper-
fect information (actual paths) with that under perfect information (counterfactual
paths). We should observe that with over entry the shakeout arrives earlier and is
more severe than the counterfactual case.
To elaborate on that, let us use Nθ0,P0
t,Tc0,x c0
t ,Vc0
T+1 for corresponding notations
under imperfect information. Recall conditions 17—19. Notice that Nθ0(>N θ) is now
exogenously given at time T +1 ,s ot h a tf o r Tc0 − 1 ≥ t ≥ T +1 , Equation 18 has



















which implies a lower price path: P0
t <P t. Because the timing of exit Tc0 is the ﬁrst


















it is straightforward to see that the shakeout arrives earlier, i.e. Tc0 <T c. Further-























In addition, the number of dotcom exits will also be larger. Rewriting Equations 14
and 15, we have that up to time Tc, the actual cumulative number of exits is greater










For the periods after time Tc, Equation 16 suggests the number of actual exits is the









The comparison of industry dynamics is illustrated with Figure 7.
3 Empirical Studies
From the above discussion, we have seen that the initial mass entry and later exit
of innovation-based pure plays are plausible given the following conditions: (1) the
innovation creates some advantages for pure-play entrants (e.g. low entry cost and/or
low operation cost); (2) the innovation is complementary to the existing technology;
(3) it takes time for the innovation to diﬀuse among incumbents using traditional
25technology. The evolving history of e-commerce suggests to us that those are indeed
the features of doing business over the Internet.
3.1 E-commerce Overview
In the early days of e-commerce, the market was excited about the potential com-
petitive advantages that Internet ﬁrms had over traditional ﬁrms. By eliminating its
physical operations, the pure plays could lower substantially the cost of entry into
the market. Internet ﬁrms also enjoyed further advantages, including access to wider
markets, lower inventory costs, ability to bypass intermediaries, lower menu costs
enabling more rapid response to market changes, ease of bundling complementary
products, ease of oﬀering 24/7 access, and so on.
However, the market experienced that eschewing physical space for cyberspace
did not come without consequences. Above all, online and oﬄine channels were
not perfect substitutes. Internet shopping ﬁts better with standardized goods and
services, for instance, buying books, which do not require personal contact with
the item or a large physical shopping space. Conversely, it ﬁts less well for the
“experience” goods and services, such as clothing, for which customers need ﬁrst-hand
experience with the item. Also, Internet ﬁrms incur extra costs by running high-tech
systems that require a more expensive labor force and by oﬀering additional physical
delivery channels.
Most important, traditional ﬁrms that succeeded getting into the online busi-
ness enjoyed great sources of synergy between their online and oﬄine channels. The
sources include common infrastructures, common operations, common marketing,
26and common customers as listed in Steinﬁeld (2002).14 They are also represented
in the many forms of complementary assets that incumbent ﬁrms possess, such as
existing supplier and distributor relationships, experience in the market, a customer
base, and others that can enable them to take better advantage of an innovation like
e-commerce. Eventually, traditional ﬁrms were able to capitalize on these synergies
between their existing and new online service channels to beat the dotcoms at their
own game.
3.2 The Retail Industry
To test our theory, we need to empirically identify the competitive advantage of mul-
tichannel ﬁrms over dotcoms, which is not obvious from anecdote evidence on the
retail industry. On one hand, we do observe dotcom retailers losing ground to multi-
channel retailers. According to Retail Forward’s annual study, dotcoms comprised 23
14An example of the use of a common infrastructure is when a ﬁrm relies on the same logistics
system or share the same IT infrastructure for both online and oﬄine sales. An order processing
system shared between e-commerce and physical channels is a good example of a common operation
as a source of synergy. This can enable, for example, improved tracking of customers’ movements
between channels, in addition to potential cost savings. E-commerce and physical channels may
also share common marketing and sales assets, such as a common product catalogue, a sales force
that understands the products and customer needs and directs potential buyers to each channel,
or advertisements and promotions that draw attention to both channels. Moreover, e-commerce
and physical outlets in click-and-mortar ﬁrms often target the same potential buyers. This enables
a click-and-mortar ﬁrm to better meet customers’ needs for both convenience and immediacy, for
example, to allow consumers to buy a product online and return it oﬄine, or try a product in the
store before purchasing it online.
27of the Top 50 E-retailers in 1999, but the number dropped to 11 in 2004 as reported
by Internet Retailer. However, on the other hand, the dotcom giant, Amazon, has
continued as the largest online retailer with $6.9 billion Web sales in 2004, far larger
than the top multichannel rivals, e.g. Oﬃce Depot ($3.1 Billion), Sears ($1.7 Billion)
or Walmart ($0.78 billion). Therefore, we need a systematic empirical analysis to
fully address this issue.
3.2.1 Data
Our analysis uses an original dataset from two primary sources: the Internet Retailer
and Compustat.L e tu sb r i e ﬂy describe here the dataset and our market deﬁnition.
The ﬁrst data source, the Internet Retailer, identiﬁes the 400 largest online re-
tailers by their 2004 Internet sales.15 It provides a comprehensive coverage of the
online retail universe: the top 400 E-retailers generated combined Web sales of more
than $51 billion and account for more than 90% of the total U.S. Internet retail sales
(excluding motor vehicle sales, travel, ﬁnancial and ticket-related services) in 2004.16
Also, with additional help from the Internet Retailer, we are able to identify the type
of each retailer, i.e. dotcoms vs. multichannels, and even divide multichannel retail-
ers further into traditional store retailers and traditional direct retailers (e.g. catalog
15Whenever possible, Internet Retailer obtained the data from the company. If the company
would not provide the data, Internet Retailer formed estimates based on other sources. Companies
were then given the opportunity to respond to the estimates.
16According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the U.S. Internet retail sales totaled $69 billion in 2004,
of which about 20% were automobile sales occurred over auto dealers’ Websites. Online travel
services, ﬁnancial brokers and dealers, and ticket sales agencies are not classiﬁed as retail and are
not included.
28and mail order retailers).
The second data source, the Compustat, reports annual total sales of publicly
traded ﬁrms. Merged with the data from the Internet Retailer,i ta d d si n f o r m a t i o n
of total sales (online plus oﬄine sales) for 275 ﬁrms in our top 400 E-retailer list.
Following Internet Retailer’s deﬁnition, we divide the 400 retailers into 14 mer-
chandising categories based on their primary business: Beaut (Health/Beauty), Book
(Books/CD/DVDs), Cloth (Apparel/Accessories), Dept (Department Store/Mass Mer-
chant), Drug (Drug/Food), Elect (Computer/Electronics), Flow (Flowers/Gifts), Hard
(Hardware/Home Improvement), House (Housewares/Home Furnishings), Jewel (Jew-
elry), Oﬃ (Oﬃce Supplies), Spec (Specialty/Non-Apparel), Sport (Sporting Goods),
Toys (Toys/Hobbies). We then try to identify if multichannel retailers have compet-
itive advantage over dotcoms in each market category.
D e t a i l e dd a t as u m m a r ys t a t i s t i c sa r ep r o v i d e di nA p p e n d i xT a b l eA 1a n dA 2 .
Both data, online sales and total sales, are based on 2004 information. Ten years
after the birth of Internet retail and ﬁve years after the start of dotcom shakeout, it
is reasonable to assume that the retail industry has well absorbed the Internet tech-
nology shock and evolved into a new steady state. Hence, this allows for a meaningful
comparison of market performance between ﬁrm types across retail categories.
3.2.2 Multichannel Retailers vs. Dotcoms
To identify the advantage of multichannel retailers over dotcoms, we ﬁrst treat the
Internet as a separate marketplace from oﬄine. We then test if multichannel retailers
enjoy larger online sales than dotcoms.17
17Based on our model, larger sales also imply larger proﬁts.








γi ∗ CATEGORYi ∗ MULTI + μ, (R1)
where ln(WEBSALE) is the logarithm of online sales, CATEGORYi is the category
dummies (=1 if in category i; =0 otherwise), MULTI is the ﬁrm type dummy (=1 if
multichannel; =0 if dotcom), and μ is the random error (likely being heteroskedastic).
The coeﬃcient estimates and robust standard errors are reported in the Appendix
Table A3.18
The γi,b yd e ﬁn i t i o n ,i st h ea v e r a g ea d d i t i o n a l online sales of a multichannel
retailer over a dotcom in category i. The estimation results conﬁrm multichannel
ﬁrms’ advantage, and also show that the advantage varies across retail categories.
Among the total 14 categories, we ﬁnd that a multichannel ﬁrm tends to sell more
online than a dotcom (γi > 0) in 10 categories, of which in 6 categories the advantage
is statistically signiﬁcant (i.e. the null hypothesis γi ≤ 0 is rejected based on a
one-sided t test). In the remaining 4 categories, a multichannel ﬁrm is found to sell
less than a dotcom on average (γi < 0) but only in one category (drug/food), the
diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant (i.e. the null hypothesis γi ≥ 0 is rejected based
on a one-sided t test).
For the 10 retail categories in which multichannel ﬁrms are found to perform bet-
ter, the average diﬀerence of online sales between a multichannel ﬁrm and a dotcom
ranges from 7% (Housewares/Home Furnishings) to 263%(Oﬃce Supplies). We also
notice that the 4 categories in which dotcoms are likely to do better are drug/food,
18We also run separate regressions for each individual retail category and get consistent results.
30department store/mass merchant, jewelry and book/CD/DVDs. One potential ex-
planation is that products in those categories tend to be standard goods and easy to
transport. Therefore, the spillovers from oﬄine channels to the online channel (e.g.
product display, customer consultation, transportation and distribution networks and
etc.) are less important than other categories.
However, treating the online as a separate marketplace is an extreme assumption
that may underestimate the performance of multichannel retailers by ignoring the
spillovers from the online channel to the oﬄine channels. Therefore, we also run the
above regression R1 using total sales (online plus oﬄine) as the dependent variable,
assuming that the online and oﬄine sales compete in the same marketplace. This may
be another extreme assumption, but at least we know the truth should lie somewhere
in between. The regression results are also presented in the Appendix Table A3, which
clearly shows that the multichannel ﬁrms dominate dotcoms in every retail category,
and the advantage is so economically and statistically signiﬁcant that there is no
comparison. This result is consistent with our general intuition. Consider Amazon
and Walmart for example, the largest dotcom retailer versus the largest multichannel
retailer19 — Amazon has 6.9 billion online and total sales in 2004, while Walmart has
0.78 billion online sales but 285 billion total sales.
The above ﬁndings are summarized in Figure 8, which clearly shows multichan-
nel ﬁrms’ dominance over dotcoms in most online retail categories, and also their
dominance in total retail sales. Using market share instead of average sales per ﬁrm,
19Amazon and Walmart are both in the Department Store/Mass Merchant category. Notice
Amazon is also the largest online book store. However, no matter which category Amazon is counted
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* Log difference of online sales per firm is statistically significant.
Figure 8: Log Diﬀerence of Sales Per Firm: Multichannel Retailers minus Dotcoms
Figure 13 in the Appendix shows the exactly same pattern. In the 4 categories where
dotcoms have larger average online sales per ﬁrm than multichannel ﬁrms, dotcoms
also have larger online market shares (i.e. >50%). However, in the other categories,
dotcoms’ online market shares are dominated by multichannel ﬁrms. In terms of
total sales (online plus oﬄine), multichannel ﬁrms dominate dotcoms in every retail
category (see Figure 14 in the Appendix).20
3.2.3 Store Retailers, Direct Retailers vs. Dotcoms
So far, we have treated multichannel retailers as a single group. However, the data
suggests that there is some important diﬀerentiation within the multichannel group.
20In fact, dotcoms’ market share of total sales are even overestimated in Figure 14 because many
multichannel retailers’ total sales are not available to be included in the calculation.
32In particular, some multichannel retailers specialize on store retailing, e.g. Walmart,
while others focus on direct retailing (catalog/mail order, sales representative, or
telemarketing), e.g. L.L. Bean. Based on each company’s historical mechandising
channels and primary business, we identify 53 direct retailers out of 282 multichannel
retailers.21 It would be interesting to see if there are diﬀerences in the online-oﬄine













βi ∗ CATEGORYi ∗ DIRECT + μ, (R2)
where ln(WEBSALE) and CATEGORY are deﬁned as before, and STORE and
DIRECT are dummies for ﬁrm type (STORE=1 if multichannel store retailer, =0
otherwise; DIRECT=1 if multichannel direct retailer, =0 otherwise). The regression
results are shown in the Appendix Table A4.22
The αi (βi),b yd e ﬁnition, is the average additional online sales of a multichannel
store (direct) retailer over a dotcom in category i.W i t h s o m e r e ﬁnement, the esti-
mation results conﬁrm the previous ﬁndings of multichannel retailers’ advantage. A
store retailer sells more online on average than a dotcom (αi > 0)i n8c a t e g o r i e s ,
of which in 3 categories the advantage is statistically signiﬁcant. A dotcom tends to
sell more online than a store retailer (αi < 0) in 6 categories, but only the diﬀerence
21Sometimes, the distinction between store retailers and direct retailers may not be very clear
since many store retailers also run catalogs and some direct retailers have stores.
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Figure 9: Log Diﬀerence of Sales Per Firm: Store (Direct) Retailers minus Dotcoms
in the Drug/Food category is statistically signiﬁcant. A multichannel direct retailer
sells more online on average than a dotcom (βi > 0)i n9c a t e g o r i e s ,o fw h i c hi n5
categories the advantage is statistically signiﬁcant. Moreover, we ﬁnd that direct re-
tailers do not have disadvantage in online sales in the Drug/Food category, but have
a disadvantage in the Oﬃce Supplies category. On average, a direct retailer seems
to enjoy larger advantage in online sales than store retailers as they generate more
online sales per ﬁrm (βi >α i) in 9 categories.
Running the regression R2 using total sales (online plus oﬄine) as the dependent
variable, we ﬁnd that both traditional store and direct retailers dominate dotcoms
in every retail category, and store retailers are typically larger than direct retailers
(αi >β i) in all categories except Sporting Goods. The regression results are also











































Figure 10: Online Sales as % of Total Sales: Store Retailers vs. Direct Retailers
The above ﬁn d i n g sa r es u m m a r i z e di nF i g u r e9 . 23 Comparing Figure 8 and Figure
9, several further ﬁndings are noticeable. First, the cross-category pattern of multi-
channel retailers’ advantage that we previously found, in both online and total sales,
is mainly driven by the store-retailers. Second, individual direct retailers tend to
sell more online than individual store retailers. It is reasonable to think that direct
retailers may be able to better adapt to the online technology, or their product lines
are simply more suitable for the online market. In fact, as shown in Figure 10, direct
retailers in general do rely more on their online channels than the store retailers.
However, higher online sales per ﬁrm does not necessarily mean that direct retailers
have contributed more to the dotcom shakeout than store retailers. Since the number
of direct retailers are small, less than 1/5 of the multichannel group, their eﬀects
23Due to no observation of direct retailers, Figure 9 and 10 cover 10 categories instead of 14.
35were rather limited. Figure 13 and 14 in the Appendix present the market share of
online and total sales by each ﬁrm type, which clearly show the dominance of store
retailers. Even so, our study of direct retailers does remind us that the sources of
multichannel synergies should include not only physical stores, but also other oﬄine
channels as well as broader assets that incumbents possess like brand, customer base
and business relations.
3.3 The Banking Industry
In addition to the retail industry, the history of online banking provides further
support for our theory.
The beginning of “Internet era” in banking service can be traced back to 1995,
when Wells Fargo became the ﬁrst bank to oﬀer its customers online-access to account
statement, and Security First Network Bank became the ﬁrst online-only bank. The
next a few years were more or less an experimental stage, during which the industry
witnessed relatively slow adoption of Internet technology — up to 1998, 6% of national
banks oﬀered transactional Internet services, and 7 banks oﬀered online-only services.
Then the diﬀusion of online banking took oﬀ in 1999 and 2000. By the end of 2000,
37% of national banks oﬀered transactional Internet banking, and about 40 new
dotcom banks had entered the market.24 However, a shakeout started striking the
dotcom banks in 2001. As shown in Figure 11 (notice its similarity to Figure 1), the
stock index25 for dotcom banks dropped by 80%, and nearly half of dotcom banks
24Data source: OCC and Online Banking Report.
25The stock index is calculated as value weighted sum of stock prices for six publicly owned









































































Figure 11: Dotcom Banks: Stock Index and Death Toll
exited the industry by 2003.26
As suggested, the key to explaining the dotcom shakeout in the banking industry
is to compare the competitive positions of pure Internet banks against their com-
petitors with brick-and-mortar branches. Similar to other e-commerce industries, the
core strategy of an Internet-only banking model is to reduce overhead expenses by
eliminating the physical branch channel. However, it turns out that the online chan-
nel is not a perfect substitute for the branch channel, but rather, a good complement.
Figure 12 shows that the number of ATMs or brick-and-mortar oﬃces per bank ac-
tually has been increasing since the mid-1990s, together with the increasing adoption
of online banking.27
(NTBK), E*trade Bank (ET), USA Bancshares (USAB) and American Bank (AMBK).
26Data Source: Online Banking Report, various issues, (1999-2003).
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Figure 12: Evolution of Banking Service Delivery Channels
Exploring the synergy between online and oﬄine channels reveals that a click-and-
mortar bank typically delivers standardized, low-value-added transactions such as bill
payments, balance inquiries, account transfers and credit card lending through the
inexpensive Internet channel, while delivering specialized, high-value-added transac-
tions such as small business lending, personal trust services and investment banking
through the more expensive branch channel. By providing more service options to
its customers, a click-and-mortar bank is able to retain its most proﬁtable customers
and generate more revenue from cross-selling.
DeYoung (2005) compares the performance between Internet-only full-service banks
ﬁces (headquarters and branches) is from Summary of Deposits, FDIC/OTS (2004), ATMs from
ATM&Debit News, Transactional Websites from OCC and Call Report.
38and their branching counterparts from 1997 to 2001.28 The empirical results show
that Internet-only banks on average have lower asset returns than incumbent branch-
ing banks as well as new branching entrants. This is primarily due to Internet-only
banks’ lower interest margins and fee income, lower levels of loan and deposit gener-
ation, fewer business loans, and higher noninterest expense for equipment and skilled
labor. These results are robust after controlling eﬀects of age and survivorship.
As more and more brick-and-mortar banks get online, the competitive pressure in
the online banking market has surely increased. According to the Call Report, 75%
of depository institutions had adopted a Website by 2004 compared to 35% in 1999,
and 60% reported Websites with transactional capability in 2004 compared to under
37% in 2000.29 Even more important, the online technology gap between dotcom
banks and traditional banks has been closing. Based on the research conducted by
GomexPro on online banking service,30 six pure-play banks ranked among the top
ten for the “Best Online Banking Service” in 1999, but the number dropped to two
in 2001, then to one in 2003 (see Table 1).
Consequently, the online-only banks have steadily lost ground to their multichan-
28Besides dotcom banks, two comparison groups of banks are investigated. One is incumbent
branching banks, including 3,777 small, established banks and thrifts (assets less than $1 billion and
at least 10 years old) in urban U.S. markets between 1997 and 2000. The other is new branching
entrants, including 644 branching banks and thrifts newly chartered during the same sample period.
29The Call Report started collecting Website information for all FDIC-insured depository insti-
tutions in 1999, but the information of Transactional Websites was not available until 2003. An
independent survey by OCC reported that 37% national banks adopted transactional Websites in
2000, which suggests the adoption rate for the overall banking population should be even lower.
30The total score of online service is evaluated asaw e i g h t e ds u mo fs c o r e si nc a t e g o r i e so ff u n c -
tionality, ease of use, privacy & security, quality & availability based on 150 to 300 criteria.
39nel competitors. As the Media Metrix traﬃc data reveal, the number of unique
visitors to multichannel banks’ Websites climbed from 6.4 million in July 2000 to
13.4 million in July 2001, while traﬃc to online-only banks fell from 1.2 million to 1.1
million over the same period (see Table 2). Meanwhile, the shakeout of online-only
banks started in 2000, with the number declining from around 50 in 2000 to less than
30 in 2003.
Table 1. GomexPro Ranking of Online Banking Service
Rank Oct. 199931 Sept. 2001 Nov. 2003
1 * SFNB Citibank Citibank
2W e l l s F a r g o * FIBI Bank of America
3 * NetBank * NetBank Wells Fargo
4 * FIBI Bank of America Charter One
5 * Wingspan Bank One Huntington
6 * CompuBank Wells Fargo Chase
7 Bank One Key Bank * E*trade Bank
8 Citibank First Tennessee National City Bank
9 * USAccess Fleet Key Bank
10 Huntington Charter One HSBC
* Online-only Bank
Security First Network Bank, the ﬁrst dotcom bank, was one of the casualties.
Acquired by Royal Bank of Canada in 1998, its Internet operations were discontinued
in 2001, and Internet transaction accounts were sold to RBC Centura Bank. Other
31SFNB: Security First Network Bank; FIBI: First Internet Bank of Indiana.
40dotcom survivors have generally adjusted their strategies, trying to avoid head-on
competition with big click-and-mortars. For example, ING Direct, the largest dotcom
bank today, oﬀers services on saving accounts but not checking, and encourages their
customers to keep their old bank accounts.
Table 2. Traﬃct oB a n k i n gS i t e s
Home & Work Users (1,000)
July 2000 July 2001 Annual Change
Total Websites 76,910 92,175 19.8%
Banking Sites 10,411 18,489 77.6%
Multichannel Banking 6,367 13,405 110.5%
Online-Only Banking 1,194 1,097 -8.1%
Multichannel Banks
Chase 957 3,647 281.1%
Wells Fargo 2,007 3,492 74.0%
Citibank 1,718 3,469 101.9%
Bank of America 1,502 3,296 119.4%
Bank One 536 1,139 112.5%
Fleet 501 900 79.6%
Online-only Banks
Netbank 688 461 -33.0%
Juniper N/A 382 N/A
E*Trade Bank 359 238 -33.7%
Wingspan Bank 282 closed N/A
414F i n a l R e m a r k s
This paper explains market turbulence, such as the recent dotcom boom/bust cycle,
as equilibrium industry dynamics resulting from a complementary technology inno-
vation. The shakeout of new entrants tends to occur if the existing technology and
assets allow incumbent ﬁrms to take better advantage of the innovation. Our em-
pirical studies on retail and banking industries reveal that it is indeed the feature
of e-commerce. Therefore, the dotcom shakeout would occur even without aggre-
gate uncertainty in the market. In addition, we show that ex ante overestimation on
dotcoms’ potential may help explain the timing and ﬁnancial loss of the shakeout.
With no externality involved, we can also show the competitive equilibrium that
we derive from the model is socially optimal. It implies that as long as the social plan-
ner does not have better information about the innovation than market participants,
there is no need for government intervention. That explains why the US government
authorities chose not to intervene the dotcom market during the boom period.
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44Table A1. Summary Statistics: Online Retail Sales ($ million)
Category Firm Type Firm # Mean Sales Std. Dev. Min Sales Max Sales % of Sales  
Overall Dotcom 118 112.99 643.57 3.30 6921.12 26.06
Multi 282 134.11 407.61 3.81 3257.42 73.94
Total 400 127.88 488.42 3.30 6921.12 100.00
Beaut Dotcom 6 25.03 13.86 8.90 48.08 9.91
Multi 6 227.68 306.42 9.26 748.00 90.09
Total 12 126.36 232.30 8.90 748.00 100.00
Book Dotcom 11 79.01 146.14 4.65 506.23 51.12
Multi 14 59.36 115.03 4.60 419.80 48.88
Total 25 68.01 127.14 4.60 506.23 100.00
Cloth Dotcom 17 31.07 44.53 3.58 184.00 11.26
Multi 82 50.75 80.14 3.81 438.96 88.74
Total 99 47.37 75.42 3.58 438.96 100.00
Dept Dotcom 5 1568.95 2997.24 46.00 6921.12 55.41
Multi 16 394.61 468.62 7.63 1740.00 44.59
Total 21 674.22 1491.33 7.63 6921.12 100.00
Drug Dotcom 5 152.27 129.22 36.25 360.10 53.58
Multi 15 43.97 45.09 4.84 150.00 46.42
Total 20 71.04 85.60 4.84 360.10 100.00
Elect Dotcom 12 129.85 287.53 5.70 1000.00 10.93
Multi 20 635.03 934.65 11.40 3257.42 89.07
Total 32 445.59 791.51 5.70 3257.42 100.00
Flow Dotcom 7 42.33 46.55 4.00 128.80 31.87
Multi 9 70.36 106.71 4.56 307.47 68.13
Total 16 58.10 84.53 4.00 307.47 100.00
Hard Dotcom 3 26.29 18.60 11.00 47.00 16.36
Multi 7 57.60 65.77 4.40 163.68 83.64
Total 10 48.21 56.47 4.40 163.68 100.00
House Dotcom 15 24.47 19.45 4.22 68.70 20.36
Multi 33 43.51 88.81 4.80 477.50 79.64
Total 48 37.56 74.58 4.22 477.50 100.00
Jewel Dotcom 5 53.91 66.73 7.47 169.24 62.59
Multi 6 26.86 18.13 5.36 52.40 37.41
Total 11 39.15 46.31 5.36 169.24 100.00
Offi Dotcom 3 10.98 4.56 6.80 15.85 0.51
Multi 6 1061.84 1542.04 5.80 3100.00 99.49
Total 9 711.55 1327.50 5.80 3100.00 100.00
Spec Dotcom 19 21.64 19.12 3.30 69.70 23.96
Multi 28 46.59 48.04 5.47 172.81 76.04
Total 47 36.51 40.63 3.30 172.81 100.00
Sport Dotcom 7 15.42 13.54 3.91 39.60 10.81
Multi 27 32.98 45.46 4.02 200.18 89.19
Total 34 29.36 41.40 3.91 200.18 100.00
Toys Dotcom 3 19.08 16.57 8.00 38.13 8.87
Multi 13 45.26 103.12 5.06 386.00 91.13
Total 16 40.35 93.03 5.06 386.00 100.00
* Dotcom refers to online-only retailers; Multi refers to multichannel retailers who sell through both online and offline channels. 
45Table A2. Summary Statistics: Total Retail Sales ($ million)
Category Firm Type Firm # Mean Sales Std. Dev. Min Sales Max Sales % of Sales  
Overall Dotcom 118 112.99 643.57 3.30 6921.12 0.95
Multi 157 8881.93 26157.75 55.83 285200.00 99.05
Total 275 5119.26 20214.92 3.30 285200.00 100.00
Beaut Dotcom 6 25.03 13.86 8.90 48.08 1.00
Multi 4 3713.02 3637.76 211.68 7750.00 99.00
Total 10 1500.23 2835.17 8.90 7750.00 100.00
Book Dotcom 11 79.01 146.14 4.65 506.23 1.76
Multi 7 6938.58 8001.81 266.72 22525.90 98.24
Total 18 2746.62 5869.53 4.65 22525.90 100.00
Cloth Dotcom 17 31.07 44.53 3.58 184.00 0.42
Multi 51 2437.35 3657.40 200.00 19566.00 99.58
Total 68 1835.78 3329.40 3.58 19566.00 100.00
Dept Dotcom 5 1568.95 2997.24 46.00 6921.12 1.52
Multi 15 33951.70 71268.26 649.00 285200.00 98.48
Total 20 25856.01 62860.18 46.00 285200.00 100.00
Drug Dotcom 5 152.27 129.22 36.25 360.10 0.41
Multi 10 18696.05 17625.36 360.00 39897.00 99.59
Total 15 12514.79 16780.48 36.25 39897.00 100.00
Elect Dotcom 12 129.85 287.53 5.70 1000.00 0.57
Multi 15 18012.44 26927.59 100.00 79905.00 99.43
Total 27 10064.62 21736.32 5.70 79905.00 100.00
Flow Dotcom 7 42.33 46.55 4.00 128.80 4.65
Multi 5 1215.42 1829.73 55.83 4466.00 95.35
Total 12 531.11 1258.37 4.00 4466.00 100.00
Hard Dotcom 3 26.29 18.60 11.00 47.00 0.07
Multi 3 36768.00 36172.98 750.00 73094.00 99.93
Total 6 18397.14 30469.33 11.00 73094.00 100.00
House Dotcom 15 24.47 19.45 4.22 68.70 1.86
Multi 13 1491.03 1429.58 187.44 5150.00 98.14
Total 28 705.37 1209.66 4.22 5150.00 100.00
Jewel Dotcom 5 53.91 66.73 7.47 169.24 5.64
Multi 2 2254.64 70.43 2204.83 2304.44 94.36
Total 7 682.69 1075.61 7.47 2304.44 100.00
Offi Dotcom 3 10.98 4.56 6.80 15.85 0.08
Multi 4 10398.50 6766.94 275.43 14448.38 99.92
Total 7 5946.71 7329.70 6.80 14448.38 100.00
Spec Dotcom 19 21.64 19.12 3.30 69.70 1.48
Multi 12 2274.48 2649.48 186.35 8666.00 98.52
Total 31 893.71 1954.07 3.30 8666.00 100.00
Sport Dotcom 7 15.42 13.54 3.91 39.60 1.11
Multi 8 1205.63 840.97 233.00 2435.86 98.89
Total 15 650.20 855.25 3.91 2435.86 100.00
Toys Dotcom 3 19.08 16.57 8.00 38.13 0.27
Multi 8 2688.31 3550.24 301.66 11100.00 99.73
Total 11 1960.34 3221.41 8.00 11100.00 100.00
   * Dotcom refers to online-only retailers; Multi refers to multichannel retailers who sell through both online and offline channels. 
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   Category          Online Sales           Total Sales 
    
 
Beaut  1.18* 4.41*** 
  [0.76] [0.80] 
 
Book  -0.32 4.61*** 
  [0.54] [0.74] 
 
Cloth  0.41* 4.46*** 
  [0.32] [0.33] 
 
Dept  -0.78 3.46*** 
  [0.91] [0.92] 
 
Drug  -1.49*** 4.14*** 
  [0.48] [0.70] 
 
Elect  1.89*** 5.04*** 
  [0.60] [0.70] 
 
Flow  0.09 3.17*** 
  [0.72] [0.83] 
 
Hard  0.07 6.35*** 
  [0.67] [1.28] 
 
House  0.12 4.05*** 
  [0.31] [0.37] 
 
Jewel  -0.36 4.32*** 
  [0.60] [0.51] 
 
Offi  2.63*** 6.21*** 
  [1.04] [0.92] 
 
Spec  0.65** 4.32*** 
  [0.29] [0.44] 
 
Sport  0.48* 4.40*** 
  [0.38] [0.45] 
 
Toys  0.13 4.58*** 
  [0.52] [0.58] 
    
Observations  400   275 
Adjusted R
2                  0.23                   0.76 
 
 
Robust Standard Errors in the brackets;  
 
One-sided t test significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%.  48   
Table A4.             Multichannel Effects: α (Store Retailer) and β (Direct Retailer) 
 
 
    Category           Online Sales        Total Sales 
        
  α (store retailer)  β (direct retailer)   α (store retailer)  β (direct retailer) 
       
 
Beaut  0.62 2.31*** 4.75***  4.07*** 
  [0.96] [0.59]  [0.68] [1.39] 
 
Book  -0.32 N/A  4.61***  N/A 
  [0.55]    [0.75]   
 
Cloth  0.14 1.54*** 4.60***  4.00*** 
  [0.32] [0.41]  [0.34] [0.44] 
 
Dept  -0.76 -0.82  4.14***  2.10** 
  [1.00] [0.99]  [0.94] [0.93] 
 
Drug  -1.62*** 0.29  4.20***  3.57*** 
  [0.48] [0.38]  [0.77] [0.39] 
 
Elect  1.78*** 2.50***  5.35*** 3.78*** 
  [0.64] [0.81]  [0.77] [0.98] 
 
Flow  -0.18 0.61  3.85***  2.16** 
  [0.79] [1.08]  [0.85] [1.05] 
 
Hard  -0.07 0.42  7.76***  3.53*** 
  [0.81] [0.89]  [0.45] [0.37] 
 
House  0.01 0.54  4.19***  3.60*** 
  [0.32] [0.52]  [0.41] [0.45] 
 
Jewel  -0.37 N/A  4.32***  N/A   
  [0.61]    [0.52]   
 
Offi  3.27*** -0.58***  6.21*** N/A 
  [1.02] [0.21]  [0.94]  
 
Spec  0.44* 1.27***  4.39***  4.20*** 
  [0.29] [0.53]  [0.49] [0.82] 
 
Sport  0.34 1.11*  4.28***  4.60*** 
  [0.38] [0.69]  [0.57] [0.47] 
 
Toys  0.13 N/A  4.58***  N/A 
  [0.52]    [0.59]   
        
 Observations  400  275 
 Adjusted R
2  0.28  0.78 
 
Robust Standard Errors in the brackets;  
 
One-sided t test significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%. 
 




















































































Figure 14: Market Share of Total Sales (Online and Oﬄine)
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